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vEXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Tax increment finance (TIF) is a popular and potentially powerful tool for places that need
economic development the most yet have the least to spend. By allowing jurisdictions to use
portions of their tax base to secure public-sector bonds, the mechanism allows fiscally strapped
localities to finance site improvements or other investments so as to “level the playing field” in
economic development.
However, poorly designed TIF programs can cause problems.  Not only can they increase
the incentives for localities to engage in inefficient, zero-sum competition for tax base with their
neighbors. Also, lax TIF rules may promote sprawl by reducing the costs of greenfield development
at the urban fringe.   It is therefore critical that state legislatures design TIF rules well.
In view of this, an analysis of the way TIF is designed and utilized in Missouri shows that:
· Missouri law creates the potential for overuse and abuse of TIF.   Vague definitions of
the allowable use of TIF permit almost any municipality, including those market forces
already favor, to use it.  Weak limits on its use for inefficient inter-local competition for tax
base touch off struggles between localities.  And the inclusion of sales tax base in the
program tilts it toward lower-wage jobs and retail projects, which rarely bring new economic
activity into a region.
· Thanks to these flaws, TIF is used extensively in high-tax-base Missouri suburban
areas with little need for assistance in the competition for tax base.  This is especially
true in the St. Louis metropolitan area.  There, TIF money very frequently flows to purposes
other than combating “blight” in disadvantaged communities—its classic purpose.  In fact,
less than half of the 21 St. Louis-area cities that were using TIF in 2001 were disadvantaged
or “at-risk” when evaluated on four indicaters of distress.  On another measure, just seven of
the 20 suburban areas using TIF fell into the “at-risk” category.
· TIF is also frequently being used in the outer parts of regions—particularly in the St.
Louis area.  Most notably, only nine of the St. Louis region’s 33 TIF districts lie in the
region’s core.  Conversely, 14 of the region’s 38 TIF districts lie west of the region’s major
ring road (I-270).  These districts, moreover, contain 57 percent of the TIF-captured property
tax base in the region. By contrast, the Kansas City region shows a pattern more consistent
with the revitalization goals of TIF. The vast majority of the districts lie in the region’s center
city, though the huge size of the city means many are still geographically far-flung.
In sum, poorly designed TIF laws are being misused at a time when state and local fiscal
pressures require every dollar be spent prudently.  As a result, a potentially dynamic tool for
reinvestment in Missouri’s most disadvantaged communities threatens to become an engine of
sprawl as it is abused by high-tax-base suburban areas that do not need public subsidies.
vi
For these reasons, Missouri would be well-served by significant reforms in the laws
governing TIF:
· The allowable purposes for TIF should be more strictly defined to target its use to
places with the most need for economic development.
· Higher level review of local determinations that TIF subsidies will support net
contributions to the regional or state economy (the “but-for” requirement) should be
implemented.
· Local TIF administrators should be required to show that TIF subsidies are consistent
with land-use and economic development needs both locally and in nearby areas.
If such reforms were put in place, TIF could be returned to its attractive main purpose: that of
providing resources that would not otherwise be available to localities that badly need them to
promote needed economic development and redevelopment.
vii
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1RECLAIMING THE INTENT:
TAX INCREMENT FINANCE IN THE KANSAS CITY AND ST. LOUIS METROPOLITAN AREAS
I.  INTRODUCTION
Tax increment finance (TIF) is a method to finance part of the public and private costs
associated with local economic development. It does this by removing tax base increases in areas
designated as TIF districts from the general tax roles and using the revenues from this “captured” tax
base to finance site improvements or other economic development costs. In the standard model,
public-sector bonds are used to raise the money needed to finance site improvements at the
beginning of the project. The revenues from the captured tax base are then used to repay the bonds.
When the bonds have been retired, the captured tax base reverts to the general tax roles.
This study shows how TIF has been used in the St. Louis and Kansas City metropolitan
areas. The following section, Section II, describes TIF in some detail, summarizes the pros and cons
of the mechanism, and discusses three issues of special concern—allowable purposes for TIF
districts, the “but-for” clause and project evaluation. Section III summarizes TIF rules in Missouri,
describes the distribution of TIF activities in the Kansas City and St. Louis metropolitan areas and
evaluates the effect of TIF on state aid to school districts in the areas that use TIF. Section IV
provides concluding comments.
2II.  ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF TIF
TIF is a popular tool for local governments because it provides a way for them to finance
local economic-development initiatives by means other than disbursements from current tax
revenues.1 Indeed, from the local point of view, TIF appears to be a costless (or very low cost) way
to finance economic-development programs—if tax base increases in the TIF district would not have
occurred without the site improvements, then the money used to finance the bonds would not have
been available in the absence of TIF. In other words, if the new tax base in a TIF district is truly base
that would not have been available without the TIF funding, the local government gets something
(funds for economic-development programming) for nothing (no decrease in the funds available for
other purposes).
This feature of TIF is both its primary strength and its major weakness. It is a strength
because TIF generates funding for economic-development activities that otherwise might not be
available (especially at a time when assistance of this sort from higher levels of government is
declining). This is especially important in fiscally stressed places that both need the economic
development the most and have the fewest resources to spend. It is a weakness because it reduces
the apparent costs of economic development activities that often generate no net additions to the
overall regional or state economy. When the economic activity encouraged by TIF funding
represents activity that would have occurred somewhere else in the metropolitan area or the state,
then from the point of view of metropolitan or state officials, the TIF funding is simply an unneeded
public subsidy. The larger the geographic scope of your point of view, the more likely it is that TIF
will be viewed as simply another tool in the zero-sum competition for tax base that goes on in every
part of the country.
One implication of the potential zero-sum nature of TIF benefits relates to school finance. If
state governments distribute aid to localities or school districts based on local tax bases (excluding
base captured in a TIF district), then total state aid is likely to be greater than it would have been in
the absence of TIF. For instance, if a business locates in a TIF district in a St. Louis-area suburb and
generates $1 million in TIF-captured tax base, this $1 million dollars of tax-base is not counted in the
state school aid formula that determines the amount of aid received by the local school district.
However, if that business had located in St. Louis (outside of any TIF district), then it would have
been counted in the tax base used to calculate school aid to St. Louis, reducing the amount of aid
received there. In general, the net effect of a business locating in a TIF district rather than outside of
a TIF district is an increase in total school aid distributed by the state.2
TIF offers other important advantages. It is a powerful and flexible way for state and local
governments to direct economic-development resources where they are most needed. It is powerful
because it leverages private resources—TIF bonds are repaid with tax revenues generated by the
                                                
1 By 1999 44 states had TIF legislation. Goshorn, Julie A. “In a TIF: Why Missouri Needs Tax Increment
Financing Reform” Washington University Law Quarterly 77, p. 925.
2 The actual situation in Missouri is more complicated than this because of the special treatment of selected
“held harmless” school districts in the school aid formula. See Section III, part B.
3private development fostered by the TIF district. It is flexible because the generated funds can be
spent on a wide variety of activities, while many intergovernmental funding sources come with
strings attached. In the end, local officials—the players best able to evaluate special local
circumstances—determine how the money is spent.
Another strength of TIF is that projects it supports must weather a market test of a sort not
often applied to spending from general fund budgets. Local economic-development officials must
evaluate TIF projects to ensure that they will (or will be very likely to) generate the added tax base
needed to finance the TIF bonds. If TIF expenses are financed with general obligation (GO) bonds—
bonds backed by the assets of the issuing government—and the project fails to capture enough new
tax base to finance the TIF bonds, the bonds must still be redeemed at some point from general
revenues. Similarly, if TIF bonds are financed by revenue bonds—bonds backed only by the
expected revenue stream from the project—then questionable projects are unlikely to generate
support from private investors concerned with protecting their investment.
To be sure, economic-development projects funded from a city’s annual general fund—for
instance, from the local economic-development agency’s annual budget—must also weather the
reviews built into the budget process. However, this process is unlikely to compare the required
current expenditures to the resulting future revenue increases in as rigorous a manner as TIF
funding because failure would not put the same “lien” on future revenues that a TIF bond does.
The upshot of these advantages and disadvantages, then, is that states must design TIF
rules well. Three related issues stand out: (1) the definition of allowable purposes for TIF districts; (2)
the definition of “new” activity, or activity that would have occurred “but-for” the TIF subsidies; and
(3) project evaluation requirements.
A. Allowable Purposes for TIF Districts
If TIF is to be something other than just another means for localities to “beggar-thy-neighbor”
in the competition for tax base, it must be targeted in ways that limit its use to places with a
compelling need for assistance in this competition. Different states define allowable purposes in a
variety of ways, usually based either on the characteristics of the area to be included in the TIF
district or the purposes for which the TIF funds will be used.
Local characteristics commonly used to define allowable purposes include blight (usually
defined as fully developed areas with a significant percentage of substandard or vacant buildings),
brownfields (areas with soil or other environmental remediation required) or activity in a targeted
industry (usually declining industries such as manufacturing or mining). Allowable spending
categories often include activities like low-income housing or industry retention. In addition, most
states (including Missouri) also add the catch-all “economic development” as an allowable purpose.
This category, or one like it, is often the loophole that enables non-stressed places to use TIF for
greenfield development.
4B. The “But-For” Clause
Most states require that TIF be used only to subsidize economic development that would not
have occurred without the subsidy. The intent is to prevent TIF funds from being used simply to shift
economic activity around a region in a zero-sum competition for tax base. Unfortunately, the “but-for”
requirement is inherently difficult to verify. As a result, it often consists of little more than a
requirement that TIF funds not be used to lure existing firms from another location within the same
region or state.
The difficulty of enforcing the “but-for” requirement makes it very important to carefully define
TIF’s allowable purposes. One way to minimize the costs of the violations of the “but-for” clause is to
carefully target TIF to geographic areas that are struggling or where development or redevelopment
is expensive but desirable for social reasons (such as redeveloping brownfields in areas with high
unemployment). Another is to limit subsidies to activities that private markets do not serve well (such
as very low-income housing). The difficulty in policing the “but-for” requirement is the primary reason
that vague allowable purposes like “economic development” create so much potential for TIF to be
misused.
C. Project Evaluation
There are two important parts of a good project review— appraising the financial viability of
the project and evaluating the underlying economic development value of the proposed activity.
Because TIF often involves the use of GO bonds that put public assets at risk, it is very
important that TIF projects be evaluated thoroughly enough to ensure a high likelihood that the TIF
subsidies will generate the new tax base needed to finance the bonds. TIF projects that fail to do this
increase local fiscal stress by requiring that funds be diverted from other purposes to finance the
bonds. The need for thorough evaluation inevitably increases the difficulty and costs of TIF as an
economic-development tool.
One way to ensure the proper evaluation is to require that TIF districts use only revenue
bonds, rather than GO bonds. The use of revenue bonds forces TIF projects to pass a market test—
potential investors must be convinced of the viability of the project itself, not simply of the financial
viability of the issuing government. If an adequate evaluation of the project is not available or if the
evaluation implies that the risk of default is significant, then investors are likely to require junk-bond
level returns—very high interest rates that increase the costs of the project.
Because TIF is a financial tool, it is tempting to evaluate TIF projects on that basis alone.
However, a potential TIF project should also be evaluated by how well it serves local land-use needs
and by the net economic benefits it generates. The fact that a project that is viable financially does
not necessarily imply that it represents the best use of available resources (such as land and public
funds) or even that it is worth doing at all. For instance, a project that results in retail development
that increases tax base by enough to pay off the public costs of the project—meaning that it is
5financially viable—may also consume land that would more appropriately be used for other purposes
while generating only very low paying (or temporary) jobs with no real possibility of advancement for
the workers that get them. In short, TIF projects should be evaluated in the context of a local land-
use plan that specifies the preferred distribution of local economic activity and in the context of an
economic development plan that spells out a preferred path for the local economy.
All of the issues described in this section interact in important ways. For instance, if the
allowable purposes for TIF limit its use to areas with very high unemployment or other social needs,
then the “but-for” requirement becomes less important because the economic-development activities
are being targeted to areas where the social value is greatest. Similarly, if a way can be found to
enforce the “but-for” requirement, then TIF is unlikely to be used for greenfield development in
prosperous areas where development subsidies are unneeded.
6III. TAX INCREMENT FINANCE IN MISSOURI
Missouri’s TIF law is typical in some ways and unusual in others. The conventional features
include the menu of allowable purposes for TIF and the treatment of the “but-for” requirement. A less
common—and important—characteristic is the provision that allows localities to capture tax
increments for taxes other than the property tax.
Allowable Purposes for TIF Districts: Missouri law allows localities to designate TIF
districts in areas that fit into at least one of three designations: blight, conservation, and economic
development. A blighted area is defined by statute as “an area which, by reason of the
predominance of defective or inadequate street layout, unsanitary or unsafe conditions, deterioration
of site improvements, improper subdivision or obsolete platting, the existence of conditions which
endanger life or property by fire and other causes, or any combination of such factors, retards the
provision of housing accommodations or constitutes an economic or social liability or a menace to
the public health, safety, morals or welfare in its present condition and use.”3
The definition of conservation area is more specific. It requires that 50 percent or more of the
buildings in the district must be 35 years old or more and that the area is likely to become a blighted
area.4
To qualify as an economic development area, there must be a finding by the municipality that
TIF will not be used to compete unfairly for tax base and that the economic-development activities
are in the public interest because they discourage economic activity from leaving the state, increase
local employment or preserve the local tax base. Finally, the TIF redevelopment area must have
experienced either population decline or a decrease in the value of real property (inflation adjusted)
during the 20 years prior to designation.5
Missouri’s menu of allowable purposes is thus fairly typical. Most importantly, the menu is not
especially restrictive. It is likely, for instance, that at least some part of most municipalities, even
places that market forces already favor, could qualify for TIF under one or more of the allowable
purposes. Overuse of the blight designation has come under particular criticism.6
                                                
3 MO. REV. STAT. § 99.805.1 (1994).
4 MO. REV. STAT. § 99.805.2 (1994).
5 MO. REV. STAT. § 99.805.2 (1994). See also Goshorn, Julie A. “In a TIF: Why Missouri Needs Tax Increment
Financing Reform,” Washington University Law Quarterly 77, 919–946 and Missouri Department of Economic
Development, “Tax Increment Financing Program.” Available at www.ded.state.mo.us/communities/
communitydevelopment/pdfs/tif.pdf
6 See Goshorn, p. 923. Two local reviewers of this research also cited this as a serious concern.
7The “But-For” Clause and Project Evaluation: The Missouri TIF statute requires that the
local TIF commission prepare a redevelopment plan and determine whether TIF is needed to make
the project feasible—whether the project would not occur “but for” the TIF funding. The “but-for”
requirement may be met in several ways, “such as the lack of development at the project site;
additional costs of redevelopment; lack of private funds for the project; a projected pro-forma
indicating that the projected return on investment (without the TIF assistance) is below a market rate
of return, or other methods.”7
There are at least three serious shortcomings in this articulation of the “but-for” clause and
the project evaluation element. First, the “but-for” determination is strictly local. It is the responsibility
of the local TIF commission and the law makes no allowance for higher level review. This means
that regional or state-level zero-sum concerns—the possibility that the development would occur
elsewhere within the region or the state in the absence of the local subsidy—receives no
consideration. Second, even the local “but-for” hurdle is vague and set very low. For instance, sites
that meet the “lack of development at the project site” requirement could potentially include
greenfield sites in relatively affluent areas. Finally, the redevelopment plan required by the law
includes only the TIF site, with no reference to adjoining areas. While TIF commissions may have
some incentive to relate TIF plans to more general local economic development objectives, they are
not required to do so and they have no incentive to consider such concerns beyond municipal
boundaries.
Potential Revenue Streams:  As in most states, Missouri TIF districts may capture up to
100 percent of the increment in real property taxes generated by TIF-supported development.
However, unlike most states, the Missouri law also allows districts to capture 50 percent of local
sales and utility tax increments.8 This creates an incentive for TIF users to implement sales-tax-
intensive development strategies.9 In most cases, this means retail development, a type of
development that creates few high-wage jobs with strong career tracks. Competition for retail
development is also very likely to represent a zero-sum game from the point of view of the region or
the state—new development in one part of the region/state is likely to simply be displacing activity in
another part of the region/state.
                                                
7 Missouri Department of Economic Development, “Tax Increment Financing Program,” p. 2.  Available at
www.ded.state.mo.us/ communities/communitydevelopment/pdfs/tif.pdf
8 Districts in St. Louis and Kansas City may also capture the increment in local income taxes—they are the only
localities in the state with the authority to tax income.
9 Municipalities in the Kansas City and St. Louis metropolitan areas that use the sales tax rely very heavily on
the tax. In 1998, municipal sales tax revenues exceeded municipal property tax revenues by a factor of 2.8 in
those places.
8A. Distribution of TIF Districts and Captured Tax Base
As of February 1, 2001, there were 125 TIF districts in Missouri that had used a total of $341
million in TIF increments to finance economic-development costs.10 Seventy-three of the 125
districts were designated as blighted, 24 were conservation areas, 11 were economic-development
areas, and 15 were combinations of more than one designation.
TIF districts were located disproportionately in the Kansas City and St. Louis metropolitan
areas. Eighty-nine of the 125 districts were in the two metropolitan areas: 40 in the city of Kansas
City, 10 in Kansas City suburbs, six in St. Louis, and 33 in St. Louis suburbs. By 2000, some tax
base had actually been captured in 76 of these 89 TIF districts. Table 1 shows the distributions of
these districts by city and sector. The data show a relatively wide range of uses for TIF, with retail,
office and combined office, and retail the most common. The extensive use of TIF for retail
development is noteworthy given that retail development is unlikely to represent new activity in the
regional economy that would not have occurred without the TIF subsidies.
Maps 1 through 4 show the geographic distribution of TIF districts and captured base in the
two metropolitan areas. Table 2 shows a municipality-level summary of the TIF-captured tax base.
The Kansas City metropolitan area shows a pattern very consistent with the generally stated goals of
TIF. The vast majority of the districts lie in the core of the region—80 percent are located in Kansas
City and 14 percent are located in first-ring suburbs (though the huge size of the city means many
districts are still geographically far-flung). Only three districts lie in municipalities that do not border
Kansas City—two in Excelsior Springs and one in Kearney—and these districts contain just 6
percent of the TIF-captured tax base in the region. (See Appendix A for a description of the methods
used to compute TIF-captured tax base.)
The St. Louis region shows a much greater predominance of TIF districts in outer parts of the
region. Only nine of the region’s 33 TIF districts are in the region’s core—six in the city of St. Louis,
and three in Maplewood, a suburb bordering the city. These nine districts represented just 15
percent of TIF-captured tax base in the region. Conversely, 14 of the region’s 38 TIF districts are
outside the region’s major ring road (I-270), and these districts contain 57 percent of the TIF-
captured property tax base in the region.11
Although there are a greater number of TIF districts in the Kansas City region, communities
in the St. Louis area have captured a significantly greater share of total tax base in TIF districts—10
percent, compared to 5 percent in Kansas City. Six St. Louis municipalities show capture rates in
excess of 10 percent, compared to just one in Kansas City.12
                                                
10 Missouri Department of Economic Development, 2000 Annual Report: Tax Increment Financing Projects in
Missouri, p. 1,  Available at http://www.ecodev.state.mo.us/cd/finance/tif.htm  Reviewers noted that this source
may not include all TIF districts in the state.
11 Districts outside I-270 include those in Hillsboro, St. Charles, St. Peters, Chesterfield, Eureka, Ballwin,
Fenton, Hazelwood, and Wentzville.
12 The single very high capture rate in the Kansas City region—37 percent in Excelsior Springs—is the result of
a very high measured rate for the sales tax base. This percentage may be the result of incorrect reporting in the
9Table 1: Distribution of TIF Districts by City and Function
Percentage Distribution of Districts by Sector
Metro # of Retail/Office
Area County City Districts Retail Combined Office Industrial Mixed Other
K. C. Clay Excelsior Springs 2 100 0 0 0 0 0
K. C. Jackson Grandview 3 67 0 0 33 0 0
K. C. Jackson Kansas City 40 5 28 25 10 13 20
K. C. Jackson Lee's Summit 2 50 0 0 50 0 0
K. C. Jackson Raytown 2 50 0 0 50 0 0
K. C. Total 49 16 22 20 14 10 16
St. L. Jefferson Hillsboro 1 0 0 0 0 0 100
St. L. St. Charles St. Charles 4 50 25 0 25 0 0
St. L. St. Charles St. Peters 2 0 50 0 50 0 0
St. L. St. Louis Brentwood 1 0 100 0 0 0 0
St. L. St. Louis Bridgeton 1 100 0 0 0 0 0
St. L. St. Louis Chesterfield 1 0 0 0 0 0 100
St. L. St. Louis Eureka 2 50 50 0 0 0 0
St. L. St. Louis Ferguson 1 100 0 0 0 0 0
St. L. St. Louis Kirkwood 2 0 50 0 0 50 0
St. L. St. Louis Maplewood 3 33 0 33 0 0 33
St. L. St. Louis Maryland Heights 2 0 50 0 0 0 50
St. L. St. Louis University City 1 0 0 0 0 100 0
St. L. St.Louis City St. Louis 6 33 0 0 0 17 50
St. L. Total 27 30 22 4 7 11 26
Total 76 21 22 14 12 11 20
Cities with TIF districts but no captured tax base include: Ballwin (1 district), Bel Ridge (1), Crestwood (1), Fenton (2), Hazelwood (3), Kearney (1),
O'Fallon (1), Valley Park (2), and Wentzville (1). All except Kearney are in the St. Louis Metropolitan Area.
                                                                                                                                                            
state report. When contacted, local officials provided a much lower estimate for the captured property tax base
than that reported in the state report but they could not provide an alternative for the sales tax. The 45 percent
figure for the sales tax should therefore be viewed with caution. Local officials were also contacted to confirm
the very high percentages in the St. Louis area places with total percentages in excess of 20 percent. The
reported percentages were confirmed in those places.
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MAP 3:  KANSAS CITY REGION  
Percentage Sales and Property Tax Base Captured by
Tax Increment Financing Districts by Municipality
Data Source:  Kansas City Economic Development Corporation.
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Table 2: 2000 Tax Base Captured in TIF Increments by City
Property Tax Base Sales Tax Base Earned Income Tax Base Weighted
Metro # of Percentage Percentage Percentage Average
Area County City Districts Captured  of Total Captured  of Total Captured  of Total Percentage
K. C. Clay Excelsior Springs 2 4,000,000 6 58,360,300 45 37
K. C. Jackson Grandview 3 9,771,225 6 12,469,950 5 5
K. C. Jackson Kansas City 40 209,045,399 8 n.a. n.a. 643,167,653 4 5
K. C. Jackson Lee's Summit 2 30,314,264 4 75,030 0 4
K. C. Jackson Raytown 2 5,081,119 2 2,753,954 1 2
K. C. Total 49 258,212,007 7 73,659,234 5 643,167,653 4 5
St. L. Jefferson Hillsboro 1 892,414 7 861,455 4 5
St. L. St. Charles St. Charles 4 20,207,273 3 51,926,000 6 5
St. L. St. Charles St. Peters 2 155,779,704 27 67,346,021 6 18
St. L. St. Louis Brentwood 1 68,826,502 39 120,880,521 51 47
St. L. St. Louis Bridgeton 1 25,505,404 8 20,513,550 3 6
St. L. St. Louis Chesterfield 1 239,863,408 23 137,557,168 19 22
St. L. St. Louis Eureka 2 49,222,713 43 74,265,266 58 52
St. L. St. Louis Ferguson 1 22,621,585 17 64,069,467 25 22
St. L. St. Louis Kirkwood 2 28,260,415 7 4,643,858 2 6
St. L. St. Louis Maplewood 3 7,694,200 10 0 0 10
St. L. St. Louis Maryland Heights 2 6,286,668 1 11,199,000 2 1
St. L. St. Louis University City 1 16,372,835 2 0 0 2
St. L. St.Louis City St. Louis 6 93,945,832 5 n.a. n.a. 98,830,100 1 2
St. L. Total 27 735,478,955 11 553,262,304 11 98,830,100 1 10
Total 76 993,690,961 9 626,921,538 9 741,997,753 2 8
Cities with TIF districts but no captured tax base include: Ballwin (1 district), Bel Ridge (1), Crestwood (1), Fenton (2), Hazelwood (3), Kearney (1), O'Fallon (1), Valley Park (2),
and Wentzville (1). All except Kearney lie in the St. Louis Metropolitan Area.
Weighted average percentages were computed using weights based on the revenues resulting from the captured tax base.
Sources: See Appendix A.
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A primary objective of TIF is to “level the playing field” in the competition for tax base by helping fiscally
stressed places with few resources to devote to the competition. It is therefore of interest to compare the
characteristics of places that use TIF to those that do not. The TIF district maps suggest that TIF has been used
much more extensively in St. Louis by suburban areas with little need for assistance in the regional competition for
tax-base. Examining the characteristics of the municipalities that employ TIF confirms this. Table 3 shows how the
cities that use TIF compare to the rest of their regions in four dimensions—their per-household property and sales
tax bases, the level of poverty in their schools, and how that poverty level has changed over time. Tax base is a
good measure of the fiscal condition of individual cities, and the school poverty is a good summary measure of the
social needs they face.13
In Kansas City, TIF users tend to command lower tax bases than their counterparts who do not use TIF.
Four of the six TIF cities have lower property tax bases and five of the six have lower sales tax bases. Three of the
six show higher poverty rates and all of them show either increasing school poverty or smaller decreases than the
average for non-TIF cities. Overall, four of the six are disadvantaged in either three or four of the four dimensions
and these places represent 96 percent of TIF-captured tax base. Only Kearney and Lee’s Summit fare well in the
tax base and poverty comparisons, and their characteristics are relatively close to the averages for non-TIF cities.
The TIF-user profiles are significantly different in the St. Louis metropolitan area. Only six of the 21 cities
that use TIF are disadvantaged in three or four of the four dimensions, and these places represent just 22 percent of
the total tax base captured by TIF.14 Indeed, five of the TIF cities are disadvantaged by none of the measures and
these places contain 23 percent of the total captured base.15 Another six places, representing 22 percent of
captured base, are disadvantaged in only one dimension.16 TIF is clearly being used extensively in the St. Louis
area by cities that already fare relatively well in inter-local competition for tax base.
The community classification system developed by Ameregis for its recent study of the 25 largest U.S.
metropolitan areas provides another way of examining these issues.17 The classification system grouped suburban
municipalities according to total tax base, tax base growth, population growth, student poverty, racial mix, population
density and age of the housing stock. The resulting groups divided suburban municipalities into three “at-risk”
categories (places showing clear signs of fiscal stress), a “bedroom developing” category (fast-growing places with
average fiscal resources), and two “affluent job-center” categories (places with very robust tax bases and low public-
service costs).
                                                
13 School poverty is measured by the percentage of elementary students eligible for free or reduced-price lunches under the
federal Free Lunch Program.
14 These cities are Bel-Ridge, Ferguson, Maplewood, University City, Valley Park, and St. Louis.
15 Wentville, Brentwood, Crestwood, Eureka, and Fenton.
16 O’Fallon, St. Peters, Ballwin, Bridgeton, Kirkwood, and Maryland Heights.
17 Myron Orfield, American Metropolitics: A New Suburban Reality (Washington: Brookings Institution,  2002).
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Table 3: Community Characteristics: Places with TIF Districts Compared to Those Without
Percent of Total Share of 1998 1998 School Change in
Metro Local Tax Base Regional Property Tax Sales Tax Poverty School Poverty
Area County City Captured by TIF Captured Base Base per Household Base per Household 1998 1993--98
K. C. Clay Excelsior Springs 37 6 78,143 25,288 27 7
K. C. Jackson Grandview 5 2 90,031 28,080 39 12
K. C. Jackson Kansas City, MO 5 87 102,297 36,511 45 1
K. C. Clay Kearney 0 0 117,825 29,003 4 -2
K. C. Jackson Lee's Summit 4 3 133,332 22,831 7 -3
K. C. Jackson Raytown 2 1 93,553 20,959 16 5
K. C. Total (Municipalities with TIF) 5 100 105,218 33,649 39 1
K. C. Rest of Metropolitan Area 0 0 113,728 25,307 21 -4
St. L. Jefferson Hillsboro 5 0 82,337 31,353 21 -5
St. L. St. Charles O'Fallon 0 0 133,742 41,166 10 -5
St. L. St. Charles St. Charles 5 5 99,343 35,392 15 -4
St. L. St. Charles St. Peters 18 16 124,222 54,379 9 -6
St. L. St. Charles Wentzville 0 0 186,609 79,824 29 -10
St. L. St. Louis Ballwin 0 0 137,680 26,958 13 -7
St. L. St. Louis Bel-Ridge 0 0 55,858 7,635 73 -3
St. L. St. Louis Brentwood 47 14 155,986 65,890 19 -3
St. L. St. Louis Bridgeton 6 3 173,977 102,315 25 25
St. L. St. Louis Chesterfield 22 27 227,946 37,999 11 8
St. L. St. Louis Crestwood 0 0 154,683 80,960 19 -6
St. L. St. Louis Eureka 52 9 180,152 65,016 12 -16
St. L. St. Louis Fenton 0 0 435,872 354,755 13 -4
St. L. St. Louis Ferguson 22 6 68,635 28,194 46 5
St. L. St. Louis Hazelwood 0 0 195,963 39,850 12 4
St. L. St. Louis Kirkwood 6 2 140,947 24,420 15 -6
St. L. St. Louis Maplewood 10 1 60,464 28,197 45 6
St. L. St. Louis Maryland Heights 1 1 183,832 78,546 13 13
St. L. St. Louis University City 2 1 86,822 12,750 45 -10
St. L. St. Louis Valley Park 0 0 95,230 11,810 40 -24
St. L. St. Louis City St. Louis 2 14 53,322 25,373 78 0
St. L. Total (Municipalities with TIF) 10 100 98,164 35,447 48 -3
St. L. Rest of Metropolitan Area 0 0 114,287 56,866 29 1
Sources: See Appendix A.
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In the Kansas City area, three of the five suburban areas using TIF (Excelsior Springs,
Grandview, and Raytown) fall into Ameregis’ at-risk categories, and the other two (Kearney and
Lee’s Summit) fall into the bedroom-developing category. In the St. Louis area just seven of the 20
suburban areas using TIF fall in the at-risk categories (Bel-Ridge, Brentwood, Ferguson, Kirkwood,
Maplewood, University City, and Valley Park), nine are bedroom-developing (Hillsboro, O’Fallon, St.
Charles, St. Peters, Ballwin, Chesterfield, Eureka, Hazelwood, and Maryland Heights), and four are
affluent job centers (Wentzville, Bridgeton, Crestwood, and Fenton). These distributions support the
analysis based simply on tax base and poverty—TIF is much more likely to be used by non-stressed
localities in the St. Louis area than in the Kansas City area.
B. TIF and State Aid for Public Schools
TIF removes a portion of local tax bases from the general tax roles. In particular, in Missouri
it removes tax base from the local school district property-tax roles that are used to compute state
aid to school districts. This means that, unless all of the economic activity supported by TIF satisfies
the “but-for” requirement from the point of view of the entire state, TIF activity increases the total
amount of state aid that the State of Missouri distributes to local school districts.18 (See Appendix B
for descriptions of the Missouri School Aid Formula, the hold-harmless exclusion, and the method
used to calculate the effects of TIF on school aid.)
There is an important exception to this rule. A number of school districts receive levels of
state aid determined not by the formula in current law that accounts for local tax base but, instead,
under a “hold harmless” clause in the law. When the current aid system was enacted in 1993, the
tax-base-equalization portion of the new school-aid formula resulted in allocations of zero aid to a
number of school districts—districts with relatively high local tax bases. To ensure that all school
districts in the state receive at least as much equalization aid as they received in 1992–93, the law
included a clause that held such school districts harmless by allocating aid to them based on an
alternative formula that does not include tax base. Since increases or decreases in local tax base
have no effect on school aid in these places, excluding TIF-captured tax base from the aid
calculation has no effect on the aid that these districts receive.
The hold-harmless clause creates a paradox when evaluating the effects of TIF on school
aids. When TIF is used in places with very high tax bases—places that would not normally be
regarded as prime candidates for the benefits associated with TIF—it does not increase the amount
of school aid that those places receive. Thus, there is a lower dollar cost to state government when
TIF is used by these places than when it is used by places that are the primary targets of the TIF
law—low-tax-base places that most need the advantages bestowed by TIF.19
                                                
18 This assumes that the state does not adjust the state aid formula year-by-year in order to generate a specific
total amount of state aid.
19 To some extent this paradox is a short-run phenomenon. In the long run, TIF-captured tax base returns to
the general tax roles. One outcome of a well-designed TIF system should be a more equal distribution of tax
base across the state’s school districts. A more equal distribution of tax bases means that there should be less
need for tax-base-equalizing school aids. Therefore, it is possible that TIF actually reduces state school-aid
costs in the long run.
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Table 4 shows the results of simulations of the effects of TIF on school-aid levels to the
school districts containing TIF-captured tax base. The analysis simulates the amount of school aid
that each district would have received in 2001 with and without the exclusion of TIF-captured base
from the school-aid formula. The analysis assumes that none of the TIF-captured tax base meets the
“but-for” criterion from the point of view of the state as a whole. In other words, it assumes that,
without TIF, all of the TIF-generated development would have occurred somewhere in Missouri. The
measured effects therefore represent upper bounds on the extra costs to the state. If all TIF-
generated tax base instead meets the state-level “but-for” requirement, then the state costs are zero.
The actual situation almost certainly falls between the two extremes.
Overall, TIF increases state aid by up to 7 percent in the Kansas City-area school districts
containing TIF districts, and by up to 5 percent to the districts in the St. Louis area with TIF-captured
tax base. The district-by-district percentages vary significantly—from zero percent in hold-harmless
districts up to 21 percent in the Fort Zumwalt District in the St. Louis area. The highest absolute cost
is associated with the Kansas City School District, comprising roughly a third of the total cost for the
two metropolitan areas combined. In most cases, however, the effects are relatively modest—
between 2 percent and 5 percent.20
There are eight hold-harmless school districts that contain TIF districts in the St. Louis area.
There are none in the Kansas City area. This is consistent with the patterns uncovered in Table 3.
Relatively high tax-base places (especially places with high property tax base—the only tax base
included in the school-aid calculation) are much more likely to be using TIF in St. Louis than in
Kansas City. TIF-associated school-aid costs to the state for these places are zero. However, the
characteristic that put these districts into the hold-harmless category (high property tax base per
pupil) also means that they are not likely to be good candidates for TIF.21
                                                
20 The total effect for all of the districts in Table 3, $22,609,829 represents 1.1 percent of aid distributed
statewide under the equity formula in 2001 and .7 percent of total 2001 school aids.
21 Two possible exceptions to this are the Maplewood-Richmond Heights and University City School Districts—
two of the cities in these districts, Maplewood and University City, show modest tax bases and relatively high
school poverty (see Table 3).
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Table 4: 2000 Property Tax Base Captured in TIF Increments and Associated School Basic Aid by School District
2001 Formula 2001 Formula
Captured Aid Calculation Aid Calculation Hold
Metro Property Tax Percentage Excluding Including Percentage Harmless
Area School District Base of Total Captured Base Captured Base Difference Difference Districts
K. C. Excelsior Springs 40 4,000,000 3 7,984,208 7,858,212 125,996 2
K. C. Grandview C-4 351,504 0 7,245,762 7,230,542 15,220 0
K. C. Hickman Mills C1 28,424,651 7 17,384,224 16,223,582 1,160,642 7
K. C. Kansas City 165,320,313 7 73,044,062 65,430,961 7,613,101 10
K. C. Lee's Summit R-VII 30,314,264 4 29,885,564 28,636,617 1,248,947 4
K. C. Liberty 10,636,220 3 12,741,804 12,333,372 408,432 3
K. C. Park Hill 4,365,952 1 7,355,526 7,166,627 188,899 3
K. C. Raytown C-2 14,799,103 3 14,447,228 13,888,659 558,569 4
K. C. Total 258,212,007 4 170,088,378 158,768,572 11,319,806 7
St. L. Brentwood 68,826,502 36 204,850 204,850 0 0 X
St. L. Ferguson-Florissant 22,621,585 3 20,498,078 19,434,864 1,063,214 5
St. L. Ft. Zumwalt R-II 155,779,704 15 24,286,018 19,176,444 5,109,574 21
St. L. Hazelwood 25,505,404 2 23,320,061 22,235,515 1,084,546 5
St. L. Hillsboro R-3 892,414 1 6,640,101 6,614,462 25,639 0
St. L. Kirkwood 28,260,415 4 862,791 862,791 0 0 X
St. L. Maplewood-Richmond Heights 7,694,200 5 371,653 371,653 0 0 X
St. L. Pattonville 6,286,668 1 1,578,523 1,578,523 0 0 X
St. L. Rockwood 289,086,121 14 9,297,391 9,297,391 0 0 X
St. L. St. Charles County R-V 11,789,430 9 788,069 788,069 0 0 X
St. L. St. Charles R-VI 8,417,843 1 6,079,079 6,079,079 0 0 X
St. L. St. Louis 93,945,832 3 108,412,229 104,409,215 4,003,014 4
St. L. University City 16,372,835 5 4,721,300 4,721,300 0 0 X
St. L. Total 735,478,955 6 207,060,143 195,774,156 11,285,987 5
Total 993,690,961 6 378,304,924 355,695,095 22,609,829 6
School districts with TIF districts but no captured base include: Lindbergh R-VII (St. L., a Hold Harmless district), North Kansas City (K. C.) and Valley Park (St. L.).
Sources: See Appendix A.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
TIF has the potential to be a powerful tool to “level the playing field” in the competition for tax
base that occurs in all U.S. metropolitan areas. It can provide resources that otherwise would not be
available to fiscally stressed localities to promote economic development and redevelopment.
However, poorly targeted TIF laws may also contribute to sprawl by subsidizing greenfield
development in high-tax-base suburban areas that need no assistance to compete effectively. Poorly
designed TIF laws can further tilt the playing field, increasing the incentives for inefficient inter-local
competition for tax base.
The Missouri TIF law clearly creates the potential for overuse or abuse. The blight,
conservation, and the catch-all economic development categories are all vaguely defined. In
addition, whether a particular use of TIF will result in unfair competition for tax base or violate the
“but-for” requirement is a strictly local determination. These factors ensure that the Missouri law
invites abuse.
Moreover, it appears that such abuse is taking place in the St. Louis metropolitan
area. Nearly 60 percent of the TIF-captured tax base in the St. Louis area is in the region’s outer
areas. Similarly, nearly one-half of it lies in municipalities showing none or just one of the four
indicators of stress shown in Table 3.
These patterns clearly imply that the law should be revised to: (1) narrow the scope of
activities or types of places eligible for TIF; (2) require review of the “but-for” implications of TIF
projects by some outside reviewer; and (3) require local TIF administrators to reconcile TIF plans
with land use and economic development needs locally and in nearby areas.
If such reforms were put in place, TIF could be returned to its attractive main purpose in
Missouri: that of providing resources that would not otherwise be available to localities that badly
need them to promote economic development and redevelopment.
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APPENDIX A: TIF-CAPTURED BASE CALCULATIONS
Data for TIF districts are from three sources. The Missouri Department of Economic
Development’s 1999 Annual Report: Tax Increment Financing Projects in Missouri and 2000 Annual
Report: Tax Increment Financing Projects in Missouri—both available at
www.ecodev.state.mo.us/cd/finance/tif.htm—provided data on revenue from TIF-captured tax base
in 1999 and 2000 for all districts except those in Kansas City. Data for Excelsior Springs and
Maplewood were subsequently modified based on conversations with local TIF administrators. Data
for districts in the City of Kansas City came from the Tax Increment Financing 2001 Annual Report,
Volumes 1 and 2, produced by the Economic Development Corporation, City of Kansas City.
Missouri Department of Economic Development reports do not provide direct estimates of
TIF-captured tax base. Instead they show cumulative revenues from TIF-captured property and
sales tax base.22  The corresponding tax bases were estimated by computing revenues in 2000
alone (the difference between cumulative 2000 revenues and cumulative 1999 revenues) and
dividing by the appropriate local tax rate.
Because data for Kansas City districts in the state reports were not consistent in the two
years, annual reports from the Kansas City Economic Development Corporation were used in place
of the state data. These reports show estimates of captured property tax base directly and revenue
from captured income tax base.
Data on local tax bases, meanwhile, come from three sources. Local property tax rate and
tax base data came from the relevant county assessor offices. Sales tax rate and revenue data are
from the Missouri Department of Revenue. Income tax base for St. Louis and Kansas City were
computed from revenue and rate data available at each city’s web site. Poverty data reported in
Table 2 are from the National Center for Education Statistics.
                                                
22 Revenues from captured sales tax base are not shown for districts in St. Louis and Kansas City. Instead
income tax revenues are shown.
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APPENDIX B: MISSOURI SCHOOL AID CALCULATIONS
Missouri Basic School Aid Formula:
1. Foundation level of funding Pupils * operating levy (actual levy or 2.75
mills, whichever is lower) * foundation tax
base per pupil ($1,307.89 in 2001)
 Plus
2. Tax effort adjustment Pupils * excess levy (actual levy –
2.75 mills or 0, whichever is greater) *
foundation tax base per pupil ($1,307.89)
Minus
3. Tax base adjustment (lesser of 12/31/94 assessed value or prior
year’s AV) * income factor (an inflator for
high-income places) * operating levy
4. Tax base growth adjustment (prior year’s AV – 12/31/94 AV) * income
factor * operating levy
5. Other revenue Intangible taxes + state railroad and utility
taxes + federal property revenue + federal
impact aid + proposition C funding + fair
share funding + free textbook funding
Equals
6. Basic Formula (1 + 2) – (3 + 4+ 5) or 0 if (1 + 2) –
(3 + 4 + 5) is less than or equal to 0
 Plus
7. At-risk adjustment (20% of foundation level per pupil from step
1 * free or reduced lunch eligible students) +
(30% of tax effort adjustment per pupil
from step 2 * free- or reduced-lunch eligible
students)
Equals
8. Direct Apportionment
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“Hold Harmless” Calculations:
If the direct apportionment per eligible pupil is less than each of two hold harmless
calculations then the district’s basic aid equals the greater of the two hold harmless indicators times
the number of eligible students. (Districts in this category are the “Hold Harmless” districts.)
If the direct apportionment per eligible pupil is greater than each of two hold harmless
calculations then the district’s basic aid equals the direct apportionment minus the at-risk adjustment
(or step 8 minus step 7).
Calculation of the Effect of TIF on School Aid:
The effect of TIF on basic aid levels was calculated by calculating basic aid with and without
including the captured tax base in the prior year assessed value in step 4. In hold harmless districts,
TIF has no effect on basic aid because the hold harmless calculations (which do not include
assessed value) replace steps 1 through 8.
Note: All of these calculations were made using the Basic School Aid Calculation Program
available at the Missouri Department of Elementary and Secondary Education web site
(www.dese.state.mo.us/divadm/finance/tools/).
